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Abstract
This thesis explores the ability for retail banks to allocate economic capital below port-
folio level. First, a discussion about capital requirements and risk measures to provide
a sound basis for determining the economic capital of the bank. In general, economic
capital is allocated to the banks portfolios but not on a more granular level, through a
capital allocation method. This study discuss three different approaches for allocation
of economic capital below portfolio level; game theory, finance and optimization. Both
the game theory and finance approach reach the same conclusion, that the best alloca-
tion principle is the gradient of the risk measure. The optimization method allocates
economic capital through minimization of a concept called risk residual, which conclude
that the optimal allocation is derived from the marginal distribution of a customer. Cap-
ital allocation below portfolio level give the management a good overview of risks from
different customers. In order to determine the performance of the portfolios in the bank
a Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital is used, with economic capital as input. The thesis
include some comments about how the choice of capital allocation methods affect the
performance measurement. The thesis concludes with an evaluation of the methods by
simulations of a fictional bank conducted in the software R.
Key Words: Risk Appetite, Economic Capital, Risk measure, Capital Allocation Meth-
ods, Allocation Below Portfolio level, Game theory, Optimization, Marginal Contribution
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0.1 Acronyms
AVaR - Average Value-at-Risk
BCBS - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Model
CL - Confidence Level
CVaR - Conditional Value-at-Risk
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RAROC - Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital
RAS - Risk Appetite Statement
ROC - Return-On-Capital
RWA - Risk Weighted Assets
S&P - Standard & Poors
SSG - Senior Supervisors Group
TVaR - Tail Value-at-Risk
VaR - Value-at-Risk
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0.2 Notations
• X denotes the risk the bank is exposed to
• i = 1,···,n are all the portfolios of the bank, with 1,···,n ∈ N
• X1 +··· +Xn is the risks of the banks portfolios
• ji = 1i,···,di are all assets in portfolio i, with 1i,···,di ∈ Di
• ρ(·) is an arbitrary risk measure
• ρ̂(·) is a coherent risk measure
• ρ(X) = CE is the amount of economic capital held by the bank
• CR is the amount of regulatory capital
• ci is the optimal amount of economic capital allocated to portfolio i
• r(·) is an arbitrary cost function
• L is the total loss of the bank
• Li is the loss of portfolio i
• lij is the loss of asset j in portfolio i
• xij is the unexpected loss of asset j in portfolio i
vi
1
Introduction
S
ince the Great Depression of the 1930’s the financial markets have experienced
rises and falls of fortune, but few events have had such severe consequences as the
global financial crisis of 2008. One could argue that the catalyst to the crisis was the
collapse of the American housing market in 2006, which set in motion a complex series of
events. These nearly broke down the whole financial system and brought the problems of
the sub-prime loans into light. The severity of the situation caused fear among investors.
Poor confidence by investors towards the stock market created passivity and a global
down-turn in the economy. The US Senate’s Levin-Coburn Report, which was released in
2011, summarized a number of possible causes for the crisis with the following statement.
[...]high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and
the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to
rein in the excesses of Wall Street.
[Levin 11, p.8].
1.1 Background
In the early 2000, during the pre-global banking crisis era, the notion of a Risk Appetite
Framework (RAF) was not given much attention. Generally, sophisticated models for
risk management as whole was not given much interest. Typically banks had a Risk
Appetite Statement (RAS) defining the level of desired risk, but most of them lacked
the framework to properly define risk appetite and the structures needed to support these
decisions within the organization. According to the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG), one
of the problems that many financial firms suffered from was, ”[...] a disparity between
the risks that the firm took and those that the Board perceived it to be taking.” [SSG 09,
p.23] The financial crisis brought this disparity into light. The report, released in 2009,
emphasized the need to involve the Board more extensively in the risk management
process. One of the proposed solutions to the information discrepancy was to implement
1
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and work with a RAF. The general definition of risk appetite is, the level of risk that
an organization is prepared to accept, before measures are needed to be taken in order
to reduce it; and the RAF is thus the framework surrounding and supporting that
statement. One of the key points for success when working with the RAS and RAF is
to embed it with the culture of the organization. The 2009 IIF report, defines the risk
culture as
[...] the norms and traditions of behaviour of individuals and of groups within
an organization that determine the way in which they identify, understand,
discuss, and act on the risks the organization confronts and the risks it takes.
[IIF SCI 09, p.31]
This statement summarize what role risk culture has in the company and how the RAS
and RAF is part of it. The culture of the company can be determined by a few key
drivers, Figure 1.1 illustrate four parameters that primarily determine the risk appetite
for a bank. With that stated, the RAF is not a static document but an ongoing process
Figure 1.1: Risk Appetite Drivers [p.4][Rittenberg 12]
which is evaluated and evolved depending on how the company performs. There are
a few factors that limit the amount of risk a bank can expose itself to. The capacity,
determine the maximum amount of risk a bank can handle. The capacity is determined
by certain restrictions, called limits. The risk tolerance depends on how much exposure
the bank is willing to have and is determined by the RAF of the bank. The tolerance
thus needs to be within the limits for the capacity. Depending on the risk tolerance the
banks wants to hold an amount of capital that hedge these risks, this is called economic
capital, denoted CE . With the calculations of a risk measure, the economic capital of
the bank can be determined. The risk measure determines how much unexpected loss
the bank is exposed to, depending on the RAF the bank have determined a quantile of
the loss distribution. The quantile determine the amount of economic capital wanted to
be held. The credit rating for the bank is based on the quantile, and thereby amount of
economic capital held. Figure 1.2 on page 3 indicate the quantile, which corresponds to
an AA grade for the bank.
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.2: Economic Capital and credit rating [p.3][Hashagen 07]
There are a number of different grades the bank can be scored, Table 1.1 on page
3 indicate some of the top grades, together with the required confidence level α of the
quantile. The maximum probability of default for the bank, with a certain rating, is
determined by 1− α.
Rating (S&P) Maximum Default Probability Required Confidence level
AAA 0.015 % 99.985 %
AA 0.050 % 99.950 %
A 0.060 % 99.940 %
A- 0.070 % 99.930 %
BBB+ 0.110 % 99.890 %
Table 1.1: Credit rating
The banks internally determine their level of economic capital, based on risk profile.
In order to prevent insolvency, default and increase the financial stability, banks are
required by law to hold a certain amount of capital, called regulatory capital, CR. For
many cases the economic capital is greater than the regulatory capital, but in some
situations it could be the other way around, so there is no general relationship between
the two capital variables.
CR Q CE
3
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1.2 Problem
The amount of economic capital chosen to be held by the bank depends on the risk
appetite of the bank and the amount of unexpected loss the bank is exposed to. It
does not exist an industry-wide standard for this calculation. Instead there are various
techniques, called risk measures, that can determine the economic capital of a bank.
The economic capital should be thought of as a burden for the bank [Denault 01, p.1],
therefore the bank wants to allocate it among its portfolios. The goal is that each
portfolio hold an amount of economic capital that corresponds to that portfolios risk
exposure. In order to complete this procedure a capital allocation method is used. It
has two main purposes:
Risk management: By allocating capital to the banks portfolios, the bank can get a
holistic view of the risks the bank is exposed to. It gives managers an indication
of which portfolios that should be increased or decreased too fit the company risk
profile.
Performance measurement: One of the most prominent methods for determining
the performance of the banks portfolios, in a fair way, is Risk-Adjusted-Return-
On-Capital, RAROC. This method adjust for the risk of the portfolios by using
the economic capital allocated to a portfolio as input in calculations.
A further discussion of uses for capital allocation can be found in e.g. [IIF SCI 09]. The
problem with allocation of economic capital to portfolios has its origin in the diversi-
fication effect. By gathering many risky assets in a bank, the total risk of the assets
becomes less than the sum of their individual risks. This is due to correlation where
risks cancel each other out. The process of capital allocation begins with aggregating
the risks in order to determine the economic capital, which is done with a risk measure,
and then allocating capital to the portfolios corresponding to their risk. The difficulty
with capital allocation is thus to determine how to distribute the effects of diversifica-
tion. Since the financial crisis the interest for risk management have increased, which
the following statement give proof of ”[...]while the financial crisis has affected banks in
different ways, the desire to improve risk management is universal.” [IIF SCI 09, p.8]
The following statement from the IFF report, highlights the need of improvement of the
level of accuracy and methods used by banks before the financial crisis.
Deficiencies in risk methodologies and reporting are being addressed through:
i) Improving risk models;
ii) Collecting more and better data
[...] [IIF SCI 09, p.9]
For the bank to not have accurate data and a liable allocation method there is a possi-
bility that the allocation does not reflect the ’true’ risk exposure. By adopting a more
sophisticated approach towards allocation of capital the banks will aspire to a more
efficient allocation. By improving the economic capital allocation the bank can more
4
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easily determine which portfolios of the bank that pose risks. One commonly state that
an asset with high risk need to be priced higher than an asset with low risk, because
the asset poses a higher threat to the bank and thereby motivates a higher return. By
having a holistic view of risks, the banks have incentives for changing their pricing struc-
ture, to a risk-based-pricing. For the risk-based-pricing structure to be considered for
implementation by banks, the allocation methods need to fulfil three properties:
Intuitive: It is important that the model can be understood by relevant staff and there-
fore should be built on some meaningful intuitive concept of risk e.g. unexpected
loss.
Stable: In the sense that the method provides a robust result i.e no major changes of
the allocation due to an extra simulation. It is also preferred that the model is not
excessively sensitive to underlying assumptions.
Transparent: As the method should be used by the whole bank it is important that the
model is built on logic and can easily be used. It is desired that the calculations
made by the method can be easily understood and backtracked.
Currently most banks apply an allocation method which allocate capital on a portfolio
level. The aim of this paper is to investigate if it would be possible to find a risk measure
and a capital allocation method, which would enable banks to allocate capital on a more
granular level; below portfolio level. By allocating capital on a customer level, the bank
will have information of the risk of each individual customer. Thereby the bank have the
possibility to price each customer according to that customers individuals risk exposure.
Our hypothesis is that, in general, banks are not pricing customers according to the
risk the customers are exposing the bank to. By changing the pricing structure, some
of its high-risk customers will be charged with a higher price and those with low risk, a
lower. In the worst case scenario, by implementing a risk-based pricing, the bank lose a
critical mass of their business because many customers end up with a higher price and
therefore take their business elsewhere; a scenario which is not significantly probable.
When introducing a more complex pricing strategy the calculations for determining
individual risk will become more advanced, than on a portfolio level. The trade-off
between more time-consuming calculations and accuracy of the model is an important
aspect to take into account when choosing method. Another interesting aspect is whether
the more complex allocation method will suit as performance measures. To address these
concerns, three research questions have been stated for this paper.
5
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1.3 Research Questions
i) How granular can a capital allocation method perform?
ii) Can a trade-off between increased calculation and accuracy of the method be deter-
mined, how does it affect the allocation methods?
iii) Which of the allocation methods works well as a performance measure?
1.4 Limitations
This paper have some structural limitations. First, there are six different categories of
risk; market-, credit-, operational-, insurance-, liquidity- and group- risk. This paper will
focus on credit risk since that will be the main risk driver for the allocation procedure.
Secondly, the theory in the paper can be applied to any bank, but the simulations
are developed too imitate a retail bank; with large portfolios of customer loans. These
simulations will be divided into two scenarios, a normal and a stressed scenario. Thirdly,
three different classes of capital allocation methods can be identified; those based on the
Vasicek model, approximation methods and Monte-Carlo simulations, all summarised
by Eva Lu¨tkebohmert in [Lutkebohmert 08]. Approximation methods generally suffice
on assets with correlated loss data, while Vacisek and Monte-Carlo simulations requires
additional data such as probability of default, modelling of exposures and loss given
default, Monte-Carlo is also computationally challenging [Mausser 08]. This paper will
explore three different capital allocation methods which will be presented in Chapter 2.
By limiting the paper to approximations methods, it ensures that all methods can be
applied to a coherent loss data structure and simulated in a feasible manner.
1.5 Purpose
The purpose of the paper is to compare three types of capital allocation methods and
investigate if any of the proposed methods would be suitable for banks to consider.
The main concern being how the methods will handle the diversification effect below
portfolio level. In order for the allocation method to work in a real-life scenario and for
banks to be interested in implement it, the model needs to be both stable, intuitive and
transparent. Currently banks can use allocation methods to determine the performance
of their portfolios, e.g. Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital, another aspect of this thesis
will address if there will be any change to performance measurement by implementing a
more granular allocation method.
1.6 Data
All data is fictional if not otherwise stated.
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1.6.1 Sources of Information
The research has been based on academic papers and financial journals with relevance
to the banking industry, please see the References section for further information.
1.7 Structure of paper
Chapter 2 provides a general background to capital requirements, risk measures, capital
allocation and specifically present the theory that concern the three capital allocation
methods that have been selected for further investigation. Chapter 3 explain the method
by which the allocation methods have been tested. Chapter 4 provides the results of from
the simulations. Section 5 will summarize some final conclusions and discuss the problem
questions posed. Figure 1.3 summarize the structure of the thesis in a flowchart.
1. 
Introduction 
Problem Background 
Research Questions 
 
1. Which of the allocation methods works well 
as a performance measure? 
2. How granular can a capital allocation method 
perform? 
3. Where should the trade-off between 
increased calculation and accuracy be drawn? 
 
 
3. Method 
Specification of 
the simulation 
Simulation of 
the bank 
Performance 
Measurement 
Answers Q. 2 
Answers Q. 1 
2. Theoretical 
Background 
 Capital requirements 
 Risk measure 
 Capital Allocation 
Regulatory 
Capital 
Economic 
Capital 
Value-at-Risk 
Expected Shortfall 
1. Game Theory 
2. Finance 
3. Optimization 
Evaluate three methods 
Risk Measures 
determine the 
Economic Capital 
     Determined by  
Capital requirements 
4. Results 
5. 
Conclusion 
Input 
Answers Q. 3 
Figure 1.3: Disposition of thesis
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2
Theoretical Background
T
he aim of this chapter is to introduce the theory concerning risk measures,
capital allocation and performance measurements. In order to do this, first capi-
tal requirements for the bank need to be defined, and subsequently the difference
between regulatory- and economic capital need to be determined. Regulatory capital
is defined by law and economic capital is determined by the bank, with use of a risk
measure. This paper will discuss two different risk measures called Value-at-Risk and
Expected Shortfall. When the economic capital of the bank is determined, it needs to be
allocated between the banks portfolios. Boonen, de Waeganaere and Norde [Boonen 12]
state that the approximative capital allocation methods, that are concerned in this pa-
per, can be divided into three sub-categories; game theory, finance and optimization. In
order to get a holistic view of the existing methods, one method from each sub-category
have been chosen for further investigation.
The first approach, game theory, as the name suggests applies the allocation problem to
a game situation with players and costs of participation. The basic assumption stems
from the conflict of cooperation and competition, which is clearly expressed by the
following quote ”People cooperate to organize corporations, then compete with other
corporations for business and with each other for positions of power within the corpora-
tion.” [Aumann 74, p.3] The game is therefore the set of interactions between people and
the people that participate are called players, with outcomes of the game called a pay-off.
The second approach, the finance method, to the capital allocation problem will take its
origin in the portfolio theory, first presented by Markowitz in 1952 [Markowitz 52]. The
theory use expected value and standard deviation, risk, as measures for ranking different
investment opportunities against each other. The 1952 theory have been updated into an
axiomatic approach, but still based on the original assumptions. The capital allocation
is determined by differentiation of a risk measure.
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The third approach, the optimization method, to capital allocation models a minimiza-
tion problem. The capital allocated to each portfolio is assumed to be exogenously
given. The allocated capital is compared with the risk of each portfolio, each positive
risk amount is called a risk residual. The allocation method tries to minimize the pos-
itive exposure by allocating capital corresponding to the marginal risk contributions of
the portfolios.
The chapter will conclude with a discussion about how capital allocation methods can
be used for performance measurement. The heart of the discussion will concern Risk-
Adjusted-Return-On-Capital, RAROC, and how the methods suits as performance mea-
surements.
2.1 Capital requirements
Theory concerning capital requirements can be found in e.g. reports from BCBS either
[BCBS 05] or [BCBS 09], which discuss the use of the Basel framework and also de-
sired characteristics of different risk measured used to determine capital requirements.
Hashagen and Demmel [Hashagen 07] provide a concise summary of the business prac-
tises around capital requirements, risk measures and capital allocation methods. The
IFF report [IIF SCI 09] provide some insight to how the banking industry is evolving
after the financial crisis. Rittenberg and Martens [Rittenberg 12] provide a holistic view
of how companies can work with risk appetite and addresses how that affect the capi-
tal requirements. Nilsson’s [Nilsson 12] lecture notes from the course NEKN83 at Lund
University provide a good discussion about risk management.
2.1.1 Regulatory Capital
The regulatory capital determines the minimum amount of capital a bank needs to hold
according to regulations, e.g. the Basel III reform. Regulatory capital is a function
determined by the market- and credit risk exposure. Currently the rules state that
”[...] the own funds in the bank must be at least 8% of the risk-weighted assets in the
bank; this is the so called capital ratio.” [Nilsson 12, p.6] Risk weighted assets is a way to
adjust for the risk of assets, depending on the risk that they are exposed too; a mortgage
loan that has a house as collateral is less risky than an unsecured loan and thus will be
weighted as a less risky loan. According to the BCBS the minimum regulatory capital
is determined by the following inequality
CR
RWA
> 8%
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The value of the regulatory capital, CR, which is given as a percentage can be decided
by the following equation
CR =
[
N
(
N−1(PD) +
√
RN−1(0.999)√
1−R
)
× LGD − PD × LGD
]
× 1 + (M − 2.5)b
1− 1.5b
where N denotes a normal distribution, PD, the Probability of Default which indicates
the probability that a loan defaults. R denotes the default correlation between the
portfolios. 0.999 indicates that the model uses a confidence interval with α = 99.9%;
since the time horizon is by default calculated on a yearly basis, the 0.001% quantile the
measure uses indicates losses that occur only once per 1000 years. LGD, Loss-Given-
Default, determines how much of the loan that is lost if it defaults. M stands for the
effective maturity of the loan. b is a maturity adjustment factor, determined as follows
b = (0.11852− 0.05478× ln(PD))2
The default correlation R is determined by the following equation
R = 0.12× (1− e−50×PD)/(1− e−50) + 0.24× (1− (1− e−50×PD))/(1− e−50)
The function has two limits which depends on the PD. With PD equal to 100% the
highest correlation is 0.12 and with PD equal to 0% the limit is 0.24. Together with the
limits, the dependence between correlation and PD for corporate exposures is shown
in Figure 2.1 on page 11. The value ′50′ is called the k-factor. It determines how
fast the exponential function decrease, it is generally set to 50 for corporate exposures,
Figure 2.1 also give an indication of the shape of the curve for varying k-factor values.
The Risk-Weighted-Assets can be derived from the following formula
RWA = CR × 12.5× EAD
Exposure-at-Default, EAD, denotes the amount of an investment which could be lost
of the loan defaults. CR is given as a percentage and therefore needs to be multiplied
with the EAD. 12.5 is the reciprocal of 8%, (1/0.08 = 12.5). Since the parameters
PD,LGD,EAD and M , may be calculated by the bank, given that the models used
are approved by the regulators, the input parameters can easily be manipulated by the
bank, which pose a problem. A further discussion about the Basel formulas for regulatory
capital can be found in e.g. [BCBS 05]
10
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Figure 2.1: Probability of Default correlation with varying k-factor
2.1.2 Economic Capital
The economic capital serve as a hedge against unexpected losses, which depends on
the risk of the banks assets. Difficulties arise because the value of the bank’s expo-
sures are never constant, it varies depending on the future value of its assets. A risk
measure aims to quantify these uncertainties related to the bank’s future value. A num-
ber of approaches have been developed to quantify the future values into an amount of
economic capital. The group of measures that perform this calculation are called risk
measures. This paper will address two quantile based risk measures, called Value-at-Risk
and Expected Shortfall. The size of the quantile is determined by the confidence interval,
α ∈ [0,1]. A higher α result in a larger amount of economic capital and therefore also a
higher credit rating. Thus a high α pose both benefits and drawbacks. A large α pose a
large burden for the bank but also a large benefit, since a good credit rating will attract
customers, shareholders, employees etc.
Since the economic capital is determined by the exposure against unexpected losses,
therefore the set of data needs to be adjusted to unexpected losses. Each asset in portfolio
i produces a loss, positive or negative, denoted li1,···,lid. The expected loss, EL, can then
be calculated by E[li1],···,E[lid]. In order to transform the expected losses to unexpected
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losses, xij , the following calculation is made
xij = l
i
j − E[lij ] , j = 1,···,d
This ensures that all assets and portfolios have expectation 0. Under the conditions that∑d
j=1 l
i
j = Li and
∑d
j=1 x
i
j = Xi, this is called to centralise variables.
2.2 Risk measures
This section will present the two most commonly used risk measures, Value-at-Risk and
Expected Shortfall. A further discussion about these risk measures and other alter-
natives, such as Standard Deviation and Expected Loss, can be found in e.g. Martin
[Martin 04] provide a comprehensive discussion of risk, risk measures and how to per-
form capital allocation. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath [Artzner 97] and [Artzner 99]
develop a set of axioms, which a risk measure should fulfil in order to be called coherent.
Jarrow, Janosi and Yildirim [Jarrow 02] discuss risk measures and a credit risk model
which incorporates both liquidity risk and correlated defaults. In order to develop the
concept of risk measures the following definition is made.
Definition 1 A risk measure ρ(·) is defined as the mapping of a random set, C, of
variables, X, into real numbers
ρ : C→ R ∪ {+∞}
The set of finite states of nature is defined by Ω and let C be the set of all risks. Thereby
C is the set of all real-valued functions of Ω. The random variable X corresponds to
the risks of the banks and can be thought of as a net worth of an element of Ω. The
number ρ(X) assigned by the measure ρ(·) to the risk X will be interpreted as the
amount of economic capital, CE desired to be held by the bank. In order to evaluate
the different risk measures and determine their respective strength and weaknesses some
common desired attributes are needed. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath have provided
a set of characteristics that can be of assistance for the evaluation. In [Artzner 97] and
[Artzner 99] four axioms are presented. If all are fulfilled by the risk measure a coherent
and sensible quantification of risk is ensured.
Monotonicity:
ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ), ∀X,Y ∈ C with X ≤ Y
Positive Homogeneous:
ρ(λX) = λρ(X), ∀X ∈ C and ∀λ ≥ 0, λ ∈ R
Translation invariance:
ρ(X + α) = ρ(X)− α,∀X ∈ C and α ∈ Rn
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Sub-additivity:
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ),∀X,Y ∈ C
Monotonicity states that if an asset has a higher loss, thereby a higher risk, than another
asset, the economic capital should be higher for the riskier asset. Positive homogeneity
ensures that the risk measure is independent of the currency in which it is measured.
Translation invariance define that no extra capital is required when adding an asset that
is risk-free. Sub-additivity states that a merger of portfolios does not produce any extra
risk.
2.2.1 Value-at-Risk
The most commonly used risk measure is the Value-at-Risk, V aR [Balog 10]. The
method is based on a confidence interval α, which determine the size of a quantile,
described below.
qα(X) = sup
x∈R
P (X ≤ x) ≥ α
The 1−α most extreme losses of the distribution are part of the quantile. V aR is defined
as the best of the values from the quantile of the 1−α worst losses. In other words, the
method determines the limit where every loss that is greater than the VaR is an extreme
loss and thus part of the quantile.
V aRα = qα(X)
The V aR is the minimal loss in the 1 − α worst cases of our portfolio. Defined for a
certain significance level, 1− α, time horizon (usually one year) and portfolio. Some of
the attractions with V aR is that it applies to all asset classes, allows for risk aggregation,
and it is intuitive, communicative and easy to compute.
Some of the criticism towards the risk measure include that it is silent about tail events
and that it is not coherent. V aR is not a coherent risk measure since it not sub-additive,
this indicates that the stand alone risk of two assets can be lower than the two combined.
This is shown by the following example introduced by [Artzner 99]:
2.2.1.1 VaR is not Sub-additive
Lets say we want to calculate the 99% V aR for two binary options A and B, written
on the same stock with strike prices KA < KB and loss distributions for the short options
are
Option A =
 1000 if ST ≤ KA
0 otherwise
(2.1)
Option B =
 1000 if ST ≥ KB
0 otherwise
(2.2)
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where ST is the stock price at the maturity of the option. Assume that P (ST ≤ KA) =
0.8% and P (ST ≥ KB) = 0.8%. when calculating a 99% interval the probability of an
outcome should be at least 1% or higher, otherwise the outcome is not registered. In
this case the 0.8% ≯ 1%, therefore the V aR0.99 of the option is 0.
V aR0.99(LA) = 0
by symmetry the
V aR0.99(LB) = 0
hence the VaR of the two individual options are 0. The combined portfolio, V aR0.99(LA+
LB) will have the 0.8% + 0.8% = 1.6% chance for a loss of 1000. Since 1.6% > 1% the
V aR0.99 of the combined options are 1000
V aR0.99(LA + LB) = 1000
Consequently, V aR0.99(LA + LB) > V aR0.99(LA) + V aR0.99(LB) thereby violating the
sub-additive condition. This simple example serve as proof that VaR is not coherent. For
a more holistic discussion about VaR Jorion [Jorion 01] or Tasche and Acerbi [Tasche 02]
is recommended.
2.2.2 Expected Shortfall
In recent time an increased interest for coherent and convex methods have been found
within the industry. Therefore one method which gains much acceptance is Expected
Shortfall (ES), a measure also called Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR), Average Value-
at-Risk (AVaR), Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR) or Expected Tail Loss (ETL). This risk
measure is also quantile based, but looks further into the tail distribution, and could be
defined as the average of VaR, mathematically we define it as
ESα(X) =
1
α
{E(X1{X≤qα(X)}) + qα(X)(α− (P(X ≤ qα(X))))}
ES gives an estimate of the size of the loss, given that an extreme event have occurred.
Main advantages of the method is that is it both sub-additive and coherent, thus it
encourages diversification. For a further discussion of ES we recommend [Martin 09].
One should also note that
ESα(L) ≥ V aRα(L) (2.3)
Figure 2.2 on page 15 shows the size of ES versus the minimum loss of the qα(X) that
V aR propose. Figure 2.2 shows clearly how intuitive equation 2.3 is.
2.2.3 Evaluation of risk measures
The two methods presented make use of the same quantile based approach to mea-
suring risk, which ensures that both methods give a result of the actual economic capital
needed to support the risk X. There exist other risk measures that do not give the same
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Figure 2.2: Value-at-Risk vs Expected Shortfall
evaluation of economic capital needed, but rather is a mapping of the quantification of
the risk e.g standard deviation. Since these methods do not give the same holistic view
of economic capital needed, they have been excluded from the analysis. Other than the
above mentioned significantly important characteristics, according to BCBS [BCBS 09],
banks require the following properties to be fulfilled by a risk measure.
Stable: In the sense that the method provides a robust result i.e no major changes of
the allocation due to an extra simulation. It is also preferred that the model does
not be too sensitive to underlying assumptions.
Coherent: The risk measure should be able to divide the economic capital into portfo-
lios of the bank and be able to take the diversification effects into account.
Intuitive: The risk measure should be in line with some meaningful intuitive concept
of risk.
Easy to compute: The risk measure should be easy to compute; especially by using a
more complex model there should be proof of improved accuracy to the results.
Easy to understand: It is the bank’s management that will make the decision about
implementation and therefore it is important that they understand it. If they do
not comprehend the model there is a large chance that the model is not imple-
mented.
Table 2.1 show how V aR and ES satisfy the proposed conditions.
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VaR ES
Intuitive Yes Sufficiently intuitive
Stable
No, depends on assumptions about loss
distribution
Depends on the loss distribution
Easy to compute
Sufficiently easy (requires estimate of loss
distribution)
Sufficiently easy (requires estimate of loss
distribution)
Easy to understand Yes Sufficiently
Coherent No Yes
Table 2.1: Risk Measures [BCBS 09, p.27]
The two methods have quite similar characteristics, when it comes to the five prop-
erties. As shown before and made apparent of Table 2.2, V aR is not coherent due failure
of the sub-additivity characteristic. When taking this into account the ES seems to be
the preferred method. For a nice loss distribution the method manages to fulfil all five
properties. Because of this ES will be the preferred risk measure used in the later part
of the paper.
Homogenity Translation Monotonicity Sub additivity
VaR " " " %
ES " " " "
Table 2.2: Risk Measure Properties [BCBS 09, p.21]
2.3 Capital Allocation
There exist various approximative approaches for allocating capital. According to [Boonen 12]
the different methods can be divided into three sub-categories depending on which basic
concept they apply to the allocation problem; game theory, finance and optimization.
Later in the paper, one method from each sub-category will be chosen and evaluated in
order to determine if there are any differences in output by the approaches. By using a
coherent risk measure to determine the economic capital of the bank, the sub-additivity
property ensure that, the economic capital for the whole bank is lower than for the some
of the individual portfolios alone. The reason for this is that the individual risks of a
portfolio are in general not perfectly correlated and therefore some hedge effects will be
in play when combining risks. The allocation method determines the rule for how these
benefits should be distributed between the different portfolios. The general definition of
a capital allocation method is:
Definition 2 Π(·) is an arbitrary allocation method that assigns the amount of economic
capital Π(Xi) to each of the risks Xi, for the portfolios i = 1,···,n; while satisfying
n∑
i=1
Π(Xi) = CE
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Which is subject to n ∈ N portfolios.
The goal of the allocation method is to allocate economic capital to the different portfo-
lios of the bank, corresponding to the risk of that portfolio. The definition also ensures
that all economic capital is allocated to the portfolios. There are two main reasons for a
bank to allocate capital. First, the allocation of capital to business units are important
when making decisions. By allocation of capital to the portfolios of the bank the man-
agement have a holistic view of the risks of the assets in a portfolio. Different hedging
possibilities can be explored by increased or decreased exposure to specific portfolios. A
certain asset as a stand-alone can pose a huge risk, but combined with the rest of the
assets of a portfolio it might serve as a hedge against other risks. The attractiveness
of a specific asset is typically evaluated by a risk-return trade-off. Therein lays the sec-
ond reason for allocation of economic capital, performance measurement. In general, the
bank has a structure of portfolios and sub-portfolios with managers deciding on strategic
decisions for the portfolios. In general, managers are being evaluated on the return of
the risk that their portfolio is exposed to. In order to give the managers a fair assessment
it is important that the economic capital is allocated according to the individual risk of
the portfolio. The return of the portfolio might then be evaluated against the allocated
economic capital. A general discussion about performance measurement and RAROC
specifically, can be found at the end of the chapter. In addition to diversification, the
bank prefer the allocation method to fulfil the following three properties.
Intuitive: For the allocation method to be understood by the whole organization, it
is valuable that relevant staff understands it and that it is based on a common
measure e.g. expected loss.
Stable: Small changes, for example an extra simulation, should not result in drastic
changes of the allocation.
Transparent: As the method should be used by the whole bank it is important that
the model is built on logic and can easily be used.
If the allocation method fulfils these characteristics the attractiveness for the bank to
consider to implement it increases. The stability property ensures that the result from
the allocation can be trusted and that further simulations will reach the same or similar
results; the method is expected to reach a single optima. For the method to be trans-
parent, the calculations should be based on logical assumptions, which can be followed
by the user. There exist allocation methods that are black-box solutions, for those cases
the managers have no control of what the model actually calculates. Sometimes this
can be unfortunate, examples can be found were allocation models change the risks for
car loans in Denmark due to a power plant accident in Japan. These events are to-
tally uncorrelated and therefore should not affect the risk on car loans; the allocation
of economic capital for car loans. The intuitive property is preferred in order for the
method to actually be implemented and understood by the staff of the bank. These three
characteristics will serve as reference points for the comparison between the allocation
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methods. Where all three characteristics are equally important. The next section will
make some restrictions of the general definition of an allocation method, by defining a
set of axioms.
2.3.1 Coherent Allocation
Shapley [Shapley 53], have developed a set of three axioms which when fulfilled by an
allocation method state a coherent allocation. These are similar to the Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber and Heath [Artzner 99] axioms for a coherent risk measure. By evaluating the
allocation method beforehand and determine that it fulfils the coherence property, the
computations may be simplified. Denault [Denault 01] summarize the three properties
as follows, where Π(·) denotes the capital allocation method, N the set of portfolios and
ρ(·) is a risk measure, thus defining the allocation problem as Π(N,ρ).
No undercut:
∀M ⊆ N,
∑
i∈M
ci ≤ ρ
(∑
i∈M
Xi
)
Symmetry: If by joining any subset M ⊆ N\{i,j}, portfolios i and j both
make the same contribution to the economic capital, then ci = cj
Risk-less allocation:
cn = ρ(αB) = −α
Recall that the nth portfolio is a risk-less instrument.
[Denault 01, p.5 Definition 3].
The no undercut property ensures that the sum of the allocations ci is less or equal
to the risk, Xi, of the sum of the portfolios. This results in an allocation where each
portfolio is allocated a smaller amount of economic capital than it would have a separate
portfolio. By sub-additivity of the risk measure, this is ensured since no portfolio can
add more risk than the portfolio has on its own. The symmetry property ensure that all
portfolios with equal risk will be allocated the same amount of economic capital. Each
allocation is thus only concerned with that portfolios risk contribution. The \ in the
definition, means the set relative complement, the set of all elements of N except those
that intersect with {i,j}. The risk-less allocation property ensures that each portfolio is
allocated capital according to its risk contributions. By adding cash or another type of
risk-less portfolio the economic capital should be allocated according to the risk measure,
which will be negative.
2.4 Allocation Methods
The following section will provide the theoretical characteristics and assumptions of the
three chosen capital allocation methods.
18
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.4.1 Game theory
The mathematical theory of games was first developed in the 1930’s [Neumann 28] and
then popularised in the 1950’s by [Neumann 44]. In 1953, Shapley [Shapley 53], pro-
duced a paper which developed a method for dividing costs between players in a game,
called the Shapley-value. That contribution developed the theory concerning capital
allocation. Since then many authors have made contributions to the theory e.g. Aubin
[Aubin 81] who applies theory from co-operative games to fuzzy co-operative games and
presents a more intuitive approach to values of fuzzy games;
Billera and Raanan [Billera 81] evaluates a linear non-atomic production game and its
cores. Billera and Heath [Billera 82] derive a procedure for sharing costs in a process,
based on four desirable properties.
Mirman and Tauman [Mirman 82] evaluates an economic cost sharing approach based
on the Shapley-value and justify their proposed price mechanism by a set of axioms and
cost functions and not game theory.
Tsanakas and Barnett [Tsanakas 03] discuss the allocation of insurance liabilities accord-
ing to Aumann-Shapley values and use a distortion risk measure.
Tsanakas [Tsanakas 04] discuss the use of distortion risk measures for determining the
economic capital that is allocated.
Homburg and Scherpereel [Homburg 08] provide a comparison between different alloca-
tion methods, when using VaR as a risk measure, and evaluate how well the allocation
methods allocate capital through a simulation.
Tsanakas [Tsanakas 09] discuss the use of distortion exponential risk measures for de-
termining economic capital applied on Aumann-Shapley values as allocation method.
De Waegenaere, Boonen and Norde [Boonen 12] discuss the use of game theory when
the and Aumann-Shapley values are not defined, an asymptotic approach to a solution
that corresponds with Mertens value is proposed.
With the most significant contributions by Aumann and Shapley [Aumann 74] who de-
velops the theory of Aumann-Shapley-values from the Shapley-value. Aubin [Aubin 79]
introduces the concept of fuzzy games, which are games that allow fractions of play-
ers. Denault [Denault 01] summarize main points from, Shapley [Shapley 53], Aumann-
Shapley [Aumann 74] and Aubin [Aubin 79] and [Aubin 81] and compare their different
approaches in a numerical example.
The game theory assumes that each of the players, i = 1,···,n ∈ N , in a game,
(X(N),F ), wants the best outcome for themselves. It further assumes that the play-
ers can co-operate with each other, and also that all players think that it is something
good to make someone better off, provided that no other player is worse off. These set
of multi-strategies is called Pareto strategies. X(N) is the set of multi-strategies of the
n players and F is the multi-loss operator, where F (x) = K. The stochastic variable
K denotes the multi-loss for the game, and thus the cost for the game. Each player,
i, is assumed to have a loss function fi, which determine player i’s loss distribution.
The strategy were the n players co-operate to form the best outcome for all players is
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called a multi-loss strategy and denoted x¯ ∈ X(N). A fundamental assumption of the
theory is that in order to reach the best strategy, losses can be transferred from one
player to another. The vector λ defines ’rates of transfer of loss’ between the players.
λ = (λ1,···,λn) ∈Mn is used by players to fuse their loss functions fi. Any weak Pareto
strategy x¯ ∈ X(N) minimizes over X(N) a collective loss 〈λ,F (·)〉 for an adequate rate of
transfer λ ∈Mn. To every multi-loss K ∈ Rn a number of units of account 〈λ,K〉 called
a ’side payment’, ω, is associated with the vector λ. Lets say there are two multi-losses,
x and y. They are transferable, under the rate λ, if and only if 〈λ,x〉 = 〈λ,y〉.
[...] any strategy which minimizes
∑n
i=1 λ
ifi(·) is a Pareto minimum, we
prove that the converse statement holds under convexity assumptions. We
generalize this theorem in the case of an economic game. Under convenient
assumptions, an allocation x¯ = {x¯1,···,x¯n} ∈ X(N) is a weak Pareto minimum
if and only if there exist a rate of transfer λ¯ ∈ Rn∗ and a price p¯ ∈ Rn∗ such
that  (i) ∀i ∈ N, λ¯ifi(x¯i) + 〈p¯, x¯i〉 = miny∈R[λ¯ifi(y) + 〈p¯,y〉],
(ii)
∑n
i=1〈p¯,x¯i〉 = supy∈Y 〈p¯,y〉
(2.4)
[Aubin 79, p.295]
The set of these solutions, Pareto minima, are too large and therefore it is desired to be
reduced. In order to decrease the possible solutions, restrictions are added to the game.
If the cost for participation in the game is too large, player i threat to leave the game.
The level of tolerated cost for participation is determined by the players threat function
t. For player i, ti determines the maximum amount of loss that player i accepts and
still stays in the game. Thereby a possible outcome of the game, a multi-loss strategy
x¯, needs to fulfil two conditions in order to become a solution.
i) Not being rejected by the set N of players.
ii) For all players i, an allocation f(x¯) ≤ ti(fi) can be found.
If these conditions are met, the solution is part of a set called imputation. Imputations
are a subset of the set of solutions. One should realize that the concept of imputations
and Pareto minima are simply types of selection functions, denoted s. The concept will
be explained by the following example from [Aubin 79]. The choice of Pareto minima
can be determined by minimizing s[FT (x)] on X(N) where FT is defined as
fti(x) =
fi(x)− α(fi)
ti(fi)− α(fi) , FT (x) = {fti(x)}i∈N
With the following restrictions.
(i) α(fi) = inf
x∈X(N)
fi
(ii) ti(fi) > α(fi) ∀i ∈ N
(2.5)
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Lets say that s(K) = sup
i∈N
Ki, then the multi-loss strategy, x¯, called ’best compromise’
can be computed through the following calculations.
∀i ∈ N, fi(x¯) ≤ (1− d¯)α(fi)− d¯ti(fi)
d¯ = inf
x∈X(N)
max fti(x) ∈ [0,1]
In order to eliminate the possibility that the selection function depend on positive affine
transformations of the loss function, the threat function must fulfil the following condi-
tions.
ti : fi → ti(fi) must satisfy ti(αf + β) = αti(fi) + β
α ∈ R+ and β ∈ R
which implies the existence of an x¯ minimizing
x 7→
n∑
i=1
|fi(x)− αi|2
|ti(fi)− αi|2 , where αi = α(fi)
The example present an alternative of how selection functions can be used to solve the
allocation problem and present a solution, which is part of the set of imputations. The
problem with the set of imputations are unfortunately the same as with the Pareto
strategies, the set of solutions is too large. The remedy to this problem is too impose
more restrictions, a concept called coalitions are introduced.
2.4.1.1 Coalitions
In order to reduce the number of solutions in the set of imputations, the players are
allowed to form coalitions. If player i joins a coalition then the behaviour of that player
alters, thereby the set of solutions decrease. Lets say player i joins coalition A, the be-
haviour of the coalition can be described by the pair {X(A),FA}. A is naturally a subset
of N and denotes the set of all players in coalition A. X(A) describes the set of multi-loss
strategies for coalition A and FA : X(A) 7→ RA is the multi-loss operator of coalition
A, which is defined as FA(x) = {fAi (x)}i∈A. The co-operative game {X(A),FA}A∈A
describes the behaviour of each player in A and the coalition A; A denotes a family of
coalitions. Coalition A can be denoted by the vector τA : N 7→ {0,1}, this vector join
each player i with his ’rate of participation’ τAi in the coalition.
τAi =
1 if player i participates in coalition A
0 otherwise
(2.6)
All n players ∈ N are either in or out of coalition A. Lets say a player m ∈ N does not
join coalition A, then per default player m join the adverse coalition, denoted coalition
A¯ of the set A¯. The players in the adverse coalition co-operate to form the best solution
for coalition A¯ and thereby not co-operating with players i in coalition A. In order to
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adapt to the new situation player i need to alter i’s loss function. Thereby each player
i ∈ A join into a multi-strategy xA ∈ X(A) with the worst losses, for player i, defined
by the loss function in equation 2.7 below.
fA]i (x
A) = sup
y∈X(N)
piAy=xA
fi(y) = sup
{xA,xAˆ}∈X(N)
fi(x
A, xAˆ) (2.7)
fA]i (x
A) is the loss function for player i of coalition A opposed to the adverse coalition
Aˆ. Coalition A ∈ A is said to reject any multi-loss strategy x ∈ X(N) if the coalition
can improve on the strategy by adopting a multi-loss strategy xA of the set of multi-loss
strategies X(A). xA would yield to each player i ∈ A a loss fAi (xA), which is smaller
than the loss fi(x). The set of solutions which have not been rejected by any coalition
A is called the core of the game, denoted O({X(A),FA}A∈A ). The core of the game can
sometimes include more than one solution and thereby being too large. The remedy for
this problem is the same as previously; introduce more restrictions.
2.4.1.2 Fuzzy Coalitions
In order to reduce the number of solutions in the core, Aubin [Aubin 79] introduces
the concept called fuzzy coalitions. It can be defined as follows
We shall say that any τ = [τ1,···,τn] ∈ [0,1]n is a ”fuzzy coalition” and that
its i-th component, τi, is the rate of participation of player i in this fuzzy
coalition. A subset T of [0,1]n which contain A is called a family of fuzzy
coalitions.
[Aubin 79, p.317 Definition 1]
The main difference to the coalitions is that fuzzy coalitions allow for fractions of players
to participate in the game. The λ-vector needs to be adjusted in order to administer
fuzzy coalitions. λ enables players, i, in a fuzzy coalition, τ , to share a given side
payments, ω, according to the following rule
K ∈ Rn such that
n∑
i=1
λiτiKi = 〈λ,τK〉 = ω
under the condition
∀i ∈ N,τi =
∑
A∈A
i∈A
m(A)
where m(A) is the probability that coalition A forms. The rate of participation of player
i is the sum of the probabilities of the formation of coalitions A to which i belongs. With
the introduction of fuzzy coalitions and fractional players, the analogy to a game with
players is not intuitive any more. The concept of the game situation is therefore instead
applied to the more relevant allocation of capital. The game, {X(A),FA} represents the
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allocation of economic capital CE . The multi-loss operator F
A determines the multi-
loss K, which for financial notations are known as, the risk measure ρ(·) and economic
capital CE . The n players in the game, divided into fractions, symbolize the n portfolios
of the bank with their corresponding assets. Thereby the concept of pooling fractions
of portfolios is more intuitive compared with the player notation. Fractions are given
as decimals e.g. 10% = 0.1, which indicates that 10% of all assets from that portfolio
participates in the coalition. When using the concept of fractional players fuzzy coalition
can be approximated by a Debrau-Scarf coalition. The approximation gives a simple and
intuitive expression to the ’rate of participation’ τ -vector.
We shall say that a fuzzy coalition τ ∈ A is a Debrau-Scarf coalition if its
rate of participation τi = pi/q ∈ Q are rational. This implies that q ≥ pi∀i =
1,···,n.
[Aubin 79, p.318]
i is regarded as a ’type of player’ and thus pi is the number of players of type i, q denotes
total number of players of all types in that coalition. Then the ’rate of participation’,
τi, of ’type’ i is the proportion of players of type i involved.
2.4.1.3 Application to the allocation problem
A fuzzy game (A ,ρ(·)) with side-payments is denoted as the game (T , J) where
∀τ ∈ T , J(τ) = {CE ∈ Rτ such that
n∑
i=1
ci = ρ(τ)}
The function ρ(·) is in the game theory literature called a ’loss function’ but is essentially
is a risk measure, which join each fuzzy coalition τ with its loss ρ(τ). The initial setting
proposed by the allocation method require that the loss ρ(τ) is shared by portfolios that
are part of τ , proportionally to their ’rates of participation’. By assuming that the loss
function ρ(·) is positively homogeneous, the set of Pareto minima is J(τN ). Thereby the
core O(T ,ρ) of the allocation can be described as the sub-differential of ρ at τN . If the
set of multi-losses CE ∈ Rn fulfil the following conditions (i)
∑n
i=1 ci = ρ(τ
N )
(ii) ∀τ ∈ T ,∑ni=1 τici ≤ ρ(τ) (2.8)
then O(T ,ρ) = ∂ρ(τN ). The solution which is in the core, is the optimal solution to
the allocation. According to Aumann and Shapley [Aumann 74], the optimal allocation
is called the ’Aumann-Shapley-prices’ or ’Aumann-Shapley per unit allocation’. The
theory assumes that there exist a cost function r, which have been defined as the risk
measure ρ(·). By solving the following equation the allocation can be found.
φASi (N,Λ,ρ) = q
AS
i =
1∫
0
∂r
∂Λi
(γΛ) dγ
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for portfolio i of the set N portfolios. The vector Λ is the ’size of business’ for each
portfolio, in an arbitrary reference unit. The per unit cost qASi is an average of the
i-th portfolio, as the level of activity increases uniformly for all portfolios from 0 to
Λ. The value of the equation has a simpler expression if ρ is a coherent and thereby a
1-homogeneous risk measure
φASi (N,Λ,ρ) =
∂r
∂Λi(Λ)
and the per unit allocation vector is the gradient of the mapping ρ evaluated at the
full-presence level Λ.
φASi (N,Λ,ρ) = ∇ρ(Λ)
The amount of risk allocated capital to each portfolio is then given by the components
of the vector Q, which is derived from the component-wise product of the vectors qAS
and Λ.
QAS = qAS . ∗ Λ
Denault neatly summarize the game theory method as ”given that the allocation process
starts with a coherent risk measure, this coherent allocation simply corresponds to the
gradient of the risk measure with respect to the presence level of the constituents of the
firm.” [Denault 01, p.26] Denault also come to the conclusion that the Aumann-Shapley-
value is the same as a coherent fuzzy value, given that the cost function r is coherent
and differentiable at Λ.
2.4.2 Finance
The initial theory provided by Markowitz [Markowitz 52] pose some inconveniences due
to the notation of risk, which is defined as ’measure of uncertainty in return’. Thus the
standard deviation does not take positive fluctuations about the return in account. Later,
authors have adopted their methods to a more convenient notion. Tasche [Tache 07]
investigates a method with kernels and Monte Carlo simulation for determining the risk
contributions for portfolios and sub-portfolios, using the risk measure V aR. Kalkbrenner
[Kalkbrener 05] applies an axiomatic approach, which depends on a chosen risk measure.
By using a set of three axioms and a coherent risk measure the capital allocation is
determined. The same conclusion is reached by Tasche [Tasche 99] who instead uses the
theory for calculation of optimal performance measurements based on the risk measures
V aR, standard deviation and ES.
The finance based allocation method assumes that the allocation, Π(·) to portfolio Xi,
only depends on Xi and the bank X. The decomposition of the rest of the portfolios
does not affect the allocation to Xi. For this section, let a probability space be defined
by (Ω,A,P). Let L0 be a vector space of all the equivalence classes of real valued random
variables on Ω. Lets also assume that the vector space L0 contains a subspace V ,
with Xi ∈ V . This allocation method propose a set of three axioms, which will define
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the optimal allocation method Π(·). The axioms have been proposed by Kalkbrenner
[Kalkbrener 05] and are presented below.
Linear aggregation: The economic capital of the bank equals the sum of the economic
capital contributions from the portfolios. Let X1,···,Xn ∈ V and a1,···,an ∈ R and
define X = a1X1 +··· +anXn. Then
ρ(X) = Π(X,X) =
n∑
i=1
aiΠ(Xi,X)
Diversification: The economic capital Π(Xi,X) of Xi ∈ V considered a portfolio of
X ∈ V does not exceed the economic capital ρ(Xi) = Π(Xi,Xi) of Xi considered
as a stand-alone portfolio.
Continuity: Small changes to the bank only have a limited effect on the economic
capital of its portfolios. The economic capital Π(Xi,X + Xi) of Xi in X + Xi
converges to the economic capital Π(Xi,X) of Xi in X if  ∈ R converges to 0.
The axioms could be explained as follows. Linear aggregation ensures that the sum of
the economic capital of the portfolios are the same as the economic capital of the bank.
Diversification, ensures that no extra risk can be added by grouping portfolios together.
Finally, the continuity ensures that small changes of the bank X, will have limited effects
on the allocation to its portfolios. Linear aggregation and diversification is given by the
risk measure being sub-additive and positive homogeneous. Continuity at X is given by
the existence of a directional derivative.
Let Π(·) be a linear, diversifying capital allocation with respect to ρ(·). If
Π(·) is continuous at X ∈ V then for all Xi ∈ V
Π(Xi,X) = lim
→0
=
ρ(X + Xi)− ρ(X)

(2.9)
[Kalkbrener 05, p.4 Theorem 3.1]
If the allocation fulfils the three axioms the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed; the
capital allocation method thus being linear, diversifying and continuous at X ∈ V . The
solution to the allocation method is thus the derivative of the risk measure ρ(·) at X in
direction of portfolio Xi.
The existence of such allocation method is determined by using the Hanh-Banach theo-
rem. Let ρ(·) be both positive homogeneous and sub-additive it can be shown that ρ(Xi)
can be determined by the element hXi which is only unique if the directional derivative
exist, shown by equation 2.9. For a further discussion of Hanh-Banach theorem and
the concepts included, the reader is recommended Kulkarni [Kulkarni ] or Kalkbren-
ner [Kalkbrener 05]. The results from the assumptions about Hanh-Banach theorem is
summarized in the following useful description.
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i) If there exist a linear, diversifying capital allocation Π(·) with respect to
ρ(·) then ρ(·) is positively homogeneous and sub-additive.
ii) If ρ(·) is positively homogeneous and sub-additive then Πρ is a linear,
diversifying capital allocation with respect to ρ(·).
[Kalkbrener 05, p.6 Theorem 4.2]
The Hahn-Banach theorem ensures the existence of a capital allocation method that fulfil
the three stated axioms. If the risk measure, ρ(·), is both homogeneous and sub-additive
and X ∈ V the following three statements are equivalent.
i) Πρ is continuous at X, i.e. for all Xi ∈ V
lim
→0
= Πρ(Xi,X + Xi) = Πρ(Xi,X)
ii) The directional derivative
lim
→0
=
ρ(X + Xi)− ρ(X)

exist for every Xi ∈ V
iii) There exists a unique h ∈ Hρ with h(X) = ρ(X)
If these conditions are satisfied then
Πρ(Xi,X) = lim
→0
=
ρ(X + Xi)− ρ(X)

(2.10)
for all Xi ∈ V .
[Kalkbrener 05, p.7 Theorem 4.3]
This equation thereby prove the existence of the allocation method as the directional
derivative of X in direction Xi. Both sub-additivity and homogeneous are fulfilled by
coherent risk measures. Since ES is a coherent risk measure the subsequent calculations
will be developed for ES, but can easily be adjusted to represent another coherent risk
measure. As stated in the risk measure section, ES determines a quantile, which depends
on the significance level α ∈ (0,1), let X ∈ V , and denote the smallest α-quantile
qα(X) = inf
x∈R
P(X ≤ x) ≥ α
The risk measure, ES, is the average of this quantile. Defined as
ESα(X) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
qu(X) du.
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ES can also be represented as
ESα(X) =
1
1− α(E[X1{X>qα(X)}] + qα(X)(P(X ≤ qα(X))− α)) (2.11)
and since the allocation problem is a continuous problem α = P(X ≤ qα(X)), which
simplifies the expression a bit. Since ES is coherent and monotonic, there exist a set Q
of probability measures that can be defined as
ESα(X) = max
Q∈Q
EQ(X) (2.12)
Q is the set of probability measures that are absolutely continuous to P, where P is the
probability space. Equation 2.12 can be justified by the following, let QX be defined by
dQX
dP
=
EQX (X) + βX1{X=qα(X)}
1− α
where
βX =
P(X ≤ qα(X))− α
P(X = qα(X))
if P(X = qα(X)) > 0 (2.13)
By equation 2.15
ESα(X) = EQX (X) = maxQ∈Q
EQ(X)
where Q is defined by
Q = {QX |X ∈ V }
Because the Hanh-Banach theorem ensure Π(Xi, X) = hY (Xi) and subsequently equa-
tion 2.10 holds, the allocation of economic capital is determined by the following equa-
tion.
ΠESα (Xi, X) = EQX (Xi) =
(
∫
Xi1{X>qα(X)}dP+ βX
∫
Xi1{X=qα(X)}dP)
1− α (2.14)
The capital allocation method is both linear and diversifying with respect to ESα, thus
chosen as the allocation method for the financial approach. Equation 2.14 propose that
if the loss X is larger than the quantile qα(X) then the expression 1{X>qα(X)} equals 1,
otherwise 0. If 1, the loss Xi should be integrated over the probability space P, which
is from α to 1. If the loss X is equal to the quantile it is on the gradient of the integral,
therefore a β-variable needs to be taken into account defined by equation 2.13.
P(X > qα(X)) = 1− α or P(X ≥ qα(X)) = 1− α (2.15)
then
lim
→0
=
dQX+Xi
dP
=
dQX
dP
a.s. (2.16)
for every Xi ∈ V and therefore ΠESα is continuous for X. Where a.s. stands for almost
surely, which has similar meaning as ’in almost all cases’. If equation 2.15 have P(X =
qα(X)) = 0, then equation 2.16 is satisfied.
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2.4.3 Optimization
Dhaene, Denuit, Goovaerts, Kaas and Vyncke present two papers on the subject, the
first concerning theory [Dhaene 02b] and the second, implementation [Dhaene 02a]. The
papers determine approximations of sums of variables, when distributions are known
but their stochastic dependence structure is either unknown or too difficult to calculate.
The theory and applications are based on claims of an insurance portfolio. Laeven and
Goovaerts [Laeven 03] determine an optimal capital allocation based on marginal dis-
tributions and a concept called risk residuals. Salam [Salam 10], discuss an insurance
companies possibility to maximize expected net after tax income by an optimization
problem and the risk measure TVaR is used for determining risk contributions. Dhaene,
Goovaerts and Kaas [Dhaene 03] evaluates different risk measures used within the insur-
ance industry and stress the importance of risk measure which can handle all dependence
structures. The paper concludes that the companies need to take the difference of allo-
cated capital and risk into account.
This method assumes that the bank hold an amount of economic capital which is
exogenously given. How this amount has been calculated is not defined, and thus the
capital is assumed to be known in advance. The full amount the bank exogenously holds
is denoted CD. The allocation method further assumes that the capital, CD have been
distributed to the i = 1,···,n ∈ N portfolios of the bank. The distribution to the portfolios
is defined by the vector CD = cD1,···,cDn. One could think that the distribution is made
according to the previous years capital allocation or possibly according to regulatory
requirements. The following inequality for the capital is assumed to hold
min[X1] + ...+ min[Xn] < CD <∞
X1,···,Xn denote the risk of portfolios of the bank. Further the marginal distributions
(FX1 ,···,FXn) of the portfolios are assumed to be known but the dependence between the
portfolios are not needed in advance. The solution is restricted to the compact set A,
defined as in equation 2.17.
A = {(cD1,···,cDn) ∈ Rn|cDi ∈ [ai, bi], ∀i = 1,···,n,
n∑
i=1
ci = CD} (2.17)
With ai,bi ∈ R ∀i and by setting ai = min[Xi] and bi = max[Xi] the random variable
vector space (L∞(Ω,F,P)) will be considered. The theory will make use of a certain
type of vector space called the Fre´chet space. In general it is a topological vector space,
it is locally convex and complete in the sense of a translation invariant metric. The
Fre´chet space is a generalisation of the Banach-space, a space which needs the translation
invariant metric to arise from a norm. In this case, the Fre´chet space will be constructed
by the marginal distributions FXi = (FX1 ,···,FXn), which allows the dependence between
the portfolios to be undefined. For further reading about Fre´chet spaces, the reader is
recommended Fre´chet [Fre´chet 67].
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For the solution to the allocation problem, the marginal distributions, (FX1 ,···,FXn),
play an important role. In order to develop the theory for allocation of capital according
to an optimization, an alternative definition of the marginal distribution needs to be
created. It is called the α-mixed inverse distribution function, which was introduced by
Dhaene [Dhaene 02b, p.10]. For a random variable X the inverse distribution function
F−1X is defined as
F−1X (p) = infx∈R
{FX(x) ≥ p}, p ∈ [0,1]
with inf ∅ = +∞ by convention. The following definition is also introduced:
F−1+X (p) = sup
x∈R
{FX(x) ≤ p}, p ∈ [0,1]
The two parts of the α-mixed inverse distribution function is defined and can be combined
to the following distribution.
F
−1(α)
X (p) = αF
−1
X (p) + (1− α)F−1+X (p), p ∈ [0,1], α ∈ [0,1]
The α-mixed distribution will be utilized when solving the allocation. For the distribu-
tion the following hold; for any random variable X and for all g with 0 < FX(g) < 1,
there exist an αg ∈ [0,1] such that F−1(αg)X (FX(g)) = g. Together with the α-mixed
distribution the allocation method make use of a concept called risk residual for solving
the allocation problem. The risk residual is defined as follows:
max(Xi − CDi,0) = (Xi − CDi)+ (2.18)
The risk residual considers the difference between the risk, Xi, of portfolio i and the
capital exogenously distributed, CDi. Whenever there is positive risk in the portfolio,
the difference is gathered in a vector called the risk residual. The residual ensures that
all risk of the portfolios will be covered by the allocation of economic capital, which can
be summarized by the following inequality:
(
n∑
i=1
Xi − CD)+ ≤
n∑
i=1
(Xi − CDi)+ a.s. (2.19)
Where a.s. again is the acronym for almost surely, in this case the exceptions to this
can e.g. be when imaginary numbers are concerned. Equation 2.19 holds under the
condition of full allocation, which is stated in equation 2.20.
CD =
n∑
i=1
CDi (2.20)
If not otherwise stated, full allocation is assumed to hold for the rest of the section.
Full allocation ensures that all the capital distributed to the portfolios is the same as
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the capital exogenously given, CD. If (
∑n
i=1CDi ≤ CD) holds, the allocation is also
super-additive and equation 2.21 holds.
ρ(
n∑
i=1
Xi − CD)+ ≤ ρ(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − CDi)+) (2.21)
If the allocation is super-additive, the risk measure ρ(·) can be defined as a first-order
stochastic dominance preserving risk measure. This is a desired characteristic, because
it ensures that the allocation method will function in a situation where the dependence
structure of the portfolios are unknown. The risk measure, ρ(·), is thereby additive
over all types of dependence structures. A risk measure that fulfil these conditions are
ρ(·) = E(·), thereby equation 2.22 holds.
E[(X1 +··· +Xn − CD)+] ≤ (
n∑
i=1
E[(Xi − CDi)+]) (2.22)
The allocation method suggest that the optimal allocation will be reached by minimizing
the exposure that the risk residual has. The capital allocation ci = (c1,···,cn) is optimal
if it minimizes the risk measure applied to the sum of the risk residuals. Where ci =
(c1,···,cn) represents the allocation to the portfolios of the bank performed after the
initial distribution, cDi, have been made. The relationship between the exogenously
given allocation and the optimal allocation is given by equation:
ρ((X1 − c1)+ +··· +(Xn − cn)+) ≤ ρ((X1 − cD1)+ +··· +(Xn − cDn)+) (2.23)
Equation 2.23 state that the sum of the risk residuals for the optimal allocation, ci is
lower than the sum of the risk residuals of the exogenously given allocation of capital,
cDi. A lesser sum of the residuals indicate that the capital allocated towards the risks are
better adjusted to correspond to the risks Xi, it also indicates that the capital CE ≥ CD.
The minimization problem of the risk measure is described in equation 2.24.
min
Π(·)
ρ(
n∑
i=1
(Xi −Π(Xi))+), subject to
n∑
i=1
Π(Xi) = CD (2.24)
In order for the risk measure to be sensible, it is desired that the risk of the portfolios are
covered. Therefore the risk measure should be maximized over all possible dependency
structures, which can be summarized as:
max
(X1,···,Xn)∈Γ
ρ((X1 +··· ,+Xn − CD)+) (2.25)
Γ denotes the set of random vectors with corresponding marginal distributions i.e. the
Fre´chet space. In summary, by maximizing the amount of capital allocated over all
dependence structures, a full allocation of the economic capital is ensured. At the same
time minimizing the risk measure, thus the exposure of the risk residual, results in an
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allocation that ensures that the risk exposure of the portfolios are taken into account.
By choosing ρ(·) = E[·], equations 2.24 and 2.25 reach the same result.
n∑
i=1
E[(Xi − F−1(αcD )Xi (FXc1+···+Xcn)(CD)))+] = E[(Xc1 +··· +Xc1 − CD)+]
in which (Xc1+···+Xc1) denotes the co-monotonic random vector in the Fre´chet
space. Henceforth, we will often denote Xc = Xc1 +··· +Xc1, and correspond-
ing (FXc(CD) = (FXc1+···+Xcn)(CD)). We tacitly assume that the solution
(c1,···,cn) of optimal allocations is internal in the domain G defined in equa-
tion 2.17.
[Laeven 03, p.9 Theorem 2.1]
By having ρ(·) = E(·), the optimal allocation of economic capital to portfolio Xi is
determined by ci = F
−1(αi)
Xi
(FXc(CD)), for the vector (α1,···,αn) in the set G. Where G
is defined in equation 2.26.
G = {(α1,···,αn) :
n∑
i=1
F
−1(αi)
Xi
(q) = CD} (2.26)
In equation 2.26, q is a constant q ∈ (0,1), so that FXi(ci) = q holds, which is the
same as ci = F
−1(αi)
Xi
(q) holds. If F
−1(α)
X (q) = F
−1
X (q) for all q ∈ (0,1) and all α ∈ [0,1]
the marginal distributions are strictly increasing and continuous. This ensures that the
solution (c1,···,cn) is unique, which indicates that the allocation is the optimal allocation.
2.5 Capital allocation used as a performance measure
The following section will explore how banks work with performance measurements and
in the method section it will be determined how suitable the three capital allocation
methods would be. There are different approaches to performance measurement, nor-
mally they are grouped into something called Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital, RAROC.
Mark and Bishop [Mark 07] who present an overview of the performance measure, its
components and its many uses. James [James 96] describe the RAROC system and how
the performance measurement is implemented at Bank of America. Stoughton and Zech-
ner [Stoughton 06] show that optimal capital budgeting and performance can be derived
from RAROC and an alternative method, Economic Value Added (EVA). Loebnitz and
Roorda [Loebnitz 11] define a framework to make economic capital and RAROC sensi-
tive to illiquidity; a liquidity adjusted risk measure is proposed and the paper show how
this can help to determine if combning positions are beneficial. Le Lesle´ and Avramova
[Lesle´ 12] address the concerns with the many alternatives that exist for calculating
RWA, and how this can undermine the Basel III framework. Tasche [Tasche 99] de-
velops a capital allocation method based on the financial approach and determines the
optimal vector of values used for performance measurements. Perold [Perold 01] devel-
ops and allocation and discuss the use and misuse of RAROC as tool for performance
measurement, capital budgeting and manager compensation.
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2.5.1 General RAROC
RAROC was developed in the 1980’s by Banker’s Trust, an alternative performance
measurement method that matured from the existing Return-On-Capital (ROC). ROC
is essentially the ratio between expected return and capital, problems arise since there is
no account taken to the risk. Two alternative investments with different risk exposure
cannot be evaluated in a fair way. The difference and improvement RAROC contributes
with, compared to ROC, is that all assets are weighted according to risk exposure.
Thereby investment opportunities with different risk exposure can be evaluated against
each other and one can determine which alternative that gives the highest return based
on initial risk. In general, the saying ”the higher the risk, the higher the return”, makes
sense according to RAROC. In the same way as investments alternatives can be ranked,
RAROC can be used to determine the performance of portfolios of a bank.
When comparing portfolios of the bank, riskier portfolios must be estimated different
from less risky portfolios. The RAROC-method, allow for such risk-adjusted comparison.
By discounting portfolio returns with corresponding portfolio risk, the performance of
the portfolios can be compared. By comparing the portfolio performance, management
will have an overview of how profitable portfolios are. Thereby management of the bank
can adjust capital requirements of returns for certain portfolios, which gives an incentive
to give a fair performance based compensation to portfolio managers.
The general formula of RAROC is defined as the ratio between expected return and
economic capital distributed to the portfolio. The expected return is (Revenue - Expenses
- Expected Loss + Income from Capital), which is denoted E[X] for the bank. Theory
state that economic capital should be defined as a function of credit risk, market risk
and operational risk. Since this thesis only focus on credit risk, the economic capital will
have the same definition as before, and only depend on credit risk.
RAROC =
E[X]
CE
The formula stated above give a RAROC for the whole bank. By dividing the parameters
into expected portfolio returns and also economic capital allocated to portfolios, RAROC
for the portfolios are determined.
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Method
I
n order to determine the difference between the three allocation methods pro-
posed, a simulation evaluated the respective methods. Special focus was put to
determine the possibility for the methods to allocate capital below portfolio level,
and still be stable, transparent and intuitive. This is of interest, because the allocation
of economic capital to each specific customer simultaneously determine the risk exposure
of the customer. The bank can thereby adapt their pricing strategy to each customers
individual risk exposure. In order to determine differences among the three methods,
the simulations were made on two different scenarios. Scenario 1, called the Equal bank,
aimed to display differences between the allocation methods, in amount of allocated eco-
nomic capital. Scenario 2, called the Unbalanced bank, aimed to determine how stable
the allocations were by testing the allocation methods on a riskier scenario, with less
low- and medium-risk assets in the bank compared to the Equal bank scenario.
3.1 General structure for the simulation
The simulation have been set up and conducted in the software ’R’. It primarily considers
a bank which have a large set of portfolios of customer loans and a small part of other
business; a retail bank. The simulated bank have, for simplicity reasons, been generalized
to only consider customer loans and no other types of business. The bank has a simple
structure divided into three levels; company, portfolio and asset level, Figure 3.1 on
page 34 demonstrate the structure of the bank. The top portfolio consist of the whole
bank, the company level, which is split into three large portfolios; A, B and C. Each
portfolio holds a number of assets with similar risk. Portfolio A, consist of low-risk loans,
Portfolio B with medium-risk loans and portfolio C of high-risk loans. The simulation
consider two different scenarios; the Equal bank, described in table 3.1 on page 34 and
the Unbalanced bank described in the tables 3.2 on page 34. The equal bank scenario,
aim to determine the methods relative differences in allocation and considered the point
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the fictional bank in the simulation
Scenario 1 The Equal bank
Portfolio A Portfolio B Portfolio C
100 low-risk assets 100 medium-risk assets 100 high-risk assets
Table 3.1: The Equal Bank - Scenario 1
of reference. The Equal bank have the same number of assets in all three portfolios,
which is considered the ’normal’ setting for the simulation. Evaluation of the allocation
methods in this scenario determine how the proportions of allocated economic capital
differ among them. The scenario also examine the ability of the methods to allocate
capital below portfolio level. The Unbalanced bank scenario, aim to establish how the
methods handle the capital allocation in a different setting, were the bank is exposed
to more risk. The comparison between the allocations of the two scenarios give an
indication of how stable the allocation methods are. The goal for the simulation is to
determine the overall performance of the allocation methods and especially determine
how well the three methods satisfy the desired properties; stability, transparency and
Scenario 2 The Unbalanced bank
Portfolio A Portfolio B Portfolio C
20 low-risk assets 50 medium-risk assets 100 high-risk assets
Table 3.2: The Unbalanced Bank - Scenario 2
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intuitivity.
3.1.1 General setting for the simulation
Because the three methods use different input parameters for the allocation, it is desired
to have a common setting that can be applied on all three methods. Thereby the results
from the allocation can be easily compared and the differences between the methods are
distinct. Before the allocation methods are introduced the economic capital of the bank
is determined by the use of a risk measure. The proposed measure is ES, because it
is coherent and sufficiently fulfils the proposed conditions desired by a risk measure, on
page 16 in Table 2.1 a summary of properties held by ES can be found. The following
section will explain this setting.
3.1.1.1 Assets
Portfolio A,B and C are formed by a number of assets; on page 34 Table 3.1 and 3.2 define
the number of assets of each portfolio for both scenarios. The required input parameters
for the risk measure and the different allocation methods differ a bit. By modelling the
loss of an asset from a distribution, each asset have a loss function and a distribution of
losses; satisfying the characteristics needed by all methods tested. It has been shown by
many authors, that financial data does not follow a normal distribution, but rather an
extreme distribution e.g. a Pareto distribution [Haas 11, p.7]. The Pareto distribution
is a family of distributions with different types of characteristics and parameters.
These types of distributions have fatter tails, thereby the probability for an extreme
event is bigger than for other distributions e.g. the normal distribution. The relevant
data for this simulation is the extreme events i.e. the data in the tails of the distribu-
tion and thus the family of Pareto distributions seem like a wise choice, for a deeper
discussion about the family of Pareto distributions [Tajvidi 06] is recommended. The
distribution chosen to characterise the asset is a General Pareto Distribution (GPD)
type II. This GPD have three parameters and by altering these significantly different
characteristics can be achieved. Because there are three different parameters there are
many possibilities to set up the distribution so that each asset is given an individual
loss distribution, which obviously is desired. In order to determine the optimal number
of simulations a convergence test can be made; the test determine at what number of
simulations the result of the calculation of CE does not improve with more simulations.
The paper by Gustafsson [Gustafsson 11] address this problem and determine a rule of
thumb for the limit of sufficiently many simulations. By using sufficiently many calcu-
lation, the confidence level α can be chosen freely and thereby the significance level can
be lowered to 1% or 0.1%. Resulting in increased accuracy the of the CE calculations.
The convergence test is outside the the scope of the paper and calculations are limited
to 1000, which limit the choice of significance level 1− α.
Because the main purpose with the simulations is to compare the differences between
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the capital allocation methods and not determine an real-life allocation, the number of
simulations seem sufficiently large. These losses are centralised, a concept explained in
the risk measure section, which gives each loss an expected value of 0. Table 3.3 describe
how the three parameters of the distribution affect the losses.
Parameter Sign Effect
Location µ ∈ R The parameter determines the smallest
value the distribution can have.
Scale σ ∈ R+ A scalar that enhances the value from
the distribution
Shape ξ ∈ R
Determines the shape of the
distribution, a larger value gives a larger
tale of the distribution and thereby
larger losses in the distribution
Table 3.3: Characteristics of the parameters of the GPD type II
Equation 3.1 below describes the equation for simulating GPD values. Where U is a
uniformly distributed parameter between [0,1].
X = µ+
σ(U−ξ − 1)
ξ
∼ GPD(µ, σ, ξ 6= 0) (3.1)
The parameters of the distributions for the assets are shown in table 3.4.
Parameter Portfolio A Portfolio B Portfolio C
Location 0 0 0
Scale 0.75 1 1.25
Shape [0.75/2, 0.75] [0.5, 1] [1.25/2, 1.25]
Table 3.4: Parameters of the GPD type II, used to simulate the assets distributions
The location parameter determines the smallest loss that the distribution can gen-
erate. Because the allocation methods only are interested in losses, it is for convenient
reasons set to 0 and thus not generating any negative losses. The scale parameter is
a scalar that resize the GPD-value; a higher value indicates a higher scaled loss. For
determining the scale parameter the following approximation is used σ = 0.5 + 0.25 ∗ r
were r is a risk factor, determined by the risk of the portfolio. It is set to 1,2 or 3, for
the portfolio A, B and C respectively. The shape parameter determines the randomness
and also the volatility of the losses. The parameter is given by an interval, which is
extracted from the scale, by the following formula [σ/2,σ]. A higher interval indicates a
higher probability for a high loss.
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3.1.1.2 Model points
One of the goals with the simulation is to determine how the capital allocation methods
differ in determining the risk exposure of a single customer. The exposure of a customer
can be derived as the economic capital allocated to the corresponding customer. In order
to determine what a customer of the bank is in the simulation, a concept called model
points will be used. Instead of deriving a loss distribution and loss function for each
customer, persons with similar characteristics and thus risk profile are grouped together
into a model point. With a large enough set of different model points the risk profiles of
the customers grouped together are not that different. Thereby the risk of the customers
are more or less similar and the loss of accuracy of the model is minimal. The optimal
level of model points can be determined by a similar convergence test described in the
Assets section. In the simulation each asset of the portfolios is thought of as a model
point. The computational benefit of model points is quickly comprehended with the
following example:
Lets say, a bank has 1 million customers and each customers risk is de-
termined by a distribution of a 1000 simulation, that is 1 billion calculations
to determine the loss distributions. By increasing the number of simulations
the accuracy of the model increase, but the amount of data quickly becomes
enormous. What if the bank is slightly bigger and has 10 million customers
and simulate each risk profile 10000 times?
The trade-off between accuracy of the method and calculations is hard to determine and
depends on what the accuracy is used for. For this simulation the number of simulation
of an asset is set to 1000, which limits the choice of significance level 1−α. For the scope
of the simulation, which is to compare how the methods allocated capital differently and
not how much they actually allocate, the accuracy of the method is accepted and the
calculations is not too time-consuming.
3.1.1.3 Aggregation with consideration of correlation
In order to determine the economic capital of the bank the contents of the portfolios
needs to be aggregated to the top level, where a risk measure can be used. When risky
assets are grouped together the overall risk of the aggregated portfolio decrease, called
diversification effect. How diversification affect the losses are determined by a correlation
matrix. There are a couple of different methods available for determining the dependence
between uncorrelated assets. A popular and fast method is the Cholesky decomposition,
which decomposes a real valued positive definite matrix, CU , into a lower triangular
matrix L and L∗ the conjugate transpose of L.
CU = L× L∗
The level of correlation is assumed to change on different levels of the simulation. Because
all assets in a portfolio have the same level of risk the correlation between them is assumed
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to be higher than between the portfolios. On the asset level of the bank CiU , for portfolio
i, is determined by a matrix of ones on the diagonal and normally distributed numbers,
between [−1,1] with mean 0.75 in the lower triangle. The lower triangle is mirrored so
that the matrix becomes symmetric, figure 3.2 on page 38 give an indication of what the
matrix CU would look like. On the portfolio level a new correlation matrix needs to be
Figure 3.2: A model of the matrix CU
formed since the correlation is assumed to be lower. Therefore the numbers in the lower
triangle of the new matrix CPU , for the portfolio level of the bank, instead is assumed to
have a mean around 0.25. Because the 1000 simulations of each asset is derived from the
same stochastic variable and correlation occur between two different stochastic variables,
the whole set of assets and simulations are kept for calculation of correlation dependence.
This matrix is called Ai with size ji × 1000, for portfolio i. The matrix of correlated
values is derived from the multiplication L × A which results in a matrix with the size
ji × 1000, called CiC . The same calculation is performed for all portfolios A, B and C,
creating matrices CAC , C
B
C and C
C
C . In order to aggregate the losses to company level,
the three matrices are each rearranged into a vector of ji ∗ 1000× 1 values. The vectors
from each portfolio are positioned into one matrix, which will have the size ji ∗ 1000× 3.
For different lengths of the ji-vector, the longest is used and shorter vectors are filled
with zeros so all vectors are of equal length, j. The new matrix is then run through the
portfolio level correlation matrix, CPC , which result in a matrix consisting of values of
losses from all assets of the bank with the correlation taken into account.
3.1.1.4 Calculation of Economic Capital
The proposed method for calculating the economic capital is ES, which is the average loss
in the 1−α quantile of worst losses. For calculation of the economic capital the correlated
losses of the bank are sorted into a vector, according to size. For this simulation α = 95%
have been chosen, which results in a quantile that take into account the 1−α = 5% worst
losses. 1/0.05 = 20 means that the 5% significance level determine losses that occur every
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20 years. As discussed in the Asset section previously, the number of simulations limits
the accuracy of α. In a real-life scenario one might consider a higher confidence level
for the quantile, such as 99% or 99.9%, a higher accuracy of the method would require
a larger set of data. ES0.95 is calculated by taking the average of the 5% worst losses of
the vector with 3 ∗ j ∗ 1000 correlated losses. ES0.95 represents the amount of economic
capital that the bank wants to allocate towards the unexpected losses of the assets. The
ES0.95 is also calculated for each portfolio and for each asset in all three portfolios.
3.2 Specific set up for the allocations methods
The specific methods and parameters used for calculating the capital allocation will be
given below.
3.2.1 Game theory
For the game theory approach, it is assumed that the whole bank join into one coalition.
This coalition is called D and contain all assets of all portfolios of the bank. The param-
eters needed are thus the τ vector which represents each assets part of participation and
a coherent and differentiable risk measure, ρ̂. The rate of participation, can either be
approximated by a Debreu-Scarf coalition, as suggested in the theory, or defined as the
relative sizes of the portfolios, in some reference unit. The later is chosen for the simu-
lation and the reference unit is defined as economic capital. The τ -vector for the assets
is thus determined by the ratio of the losses for that asset and the total losses of the bank.
The allocation to assets and portfolios are determined by the gradient of the risk measure
evaluated at the corresponding value of the τ -vector. The gradient of the risk measure is
considered to be the same as the marginal of ES, which can be abbreviated to MES. All
the risks Xi of a sub-portfolio that is larger than the q0.95(X) of portfolio X, is averaged
and called MES of sub-portfolio Xi. The MES gives the vector q, which determines
the % allocation to each portfolio. When CE for the bank have been divided into Ci for
the portfolios, the assets are allocated the ratio of MES for the asset divided by total
MES for the portfolio
MESasset
MESportfolio
. The MES for the assets are given as a % and
therefore multiplied with Ci of the portfolio to determine the allocated capital.
3.2.2 Finance
The financial approach to portfolio Xi is conditional on the parent portfolio, X having a
loss and determines the allocation thereby. By first calculating economic capital for the
bank and then for the portfolios, the initial setting is given. ES0.95 of the bank determine
the level of risk that the underlying portfolio is conditional on. Given the level of risk,
the quantile of the 95% confidence level of the portfolio is determined, and calculated
as the average of losses over that level. If there is no value larger than the ES0.95 of
the parent portfolio, X, the largest value of the portfolio, Xi is chosen as ES0.95 for Xi.
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MES is calculated the same way as for the game theory approach, by dividing each
asset MES with the portfolio MES.
3.2.3 Optimization
The optimization method takes a different approach and begins at the lowest level, asset
level. It calculates for one portfolio at the time the optimal allocation. In order to
calculate the optimal allocation for the assets the α-vector of the α-inverse distribution
needs to be evaluated. This is made according to the formula
F
−1(α)
X (p) = αF
−1
X (p) + (1− α)F−1+X (p), p ∈ [0,1], α ∈ [0,1]
where
F−1X (p) = infx∈R
{FX(x) ≥ p}, p ∈ [0,1],
and
F−1+X (p) = sup
x∈R
{FX(x) ≤ p} p ∈ [0,1]
Since the ’R’ software only handle finite series of data, the values of inf and sup needs to
be estimated. A vector [0,20000], which consist of 200000 values is set to represent all real
variables. The limit 20000 is set since the probability of a loss being higher than that is
minimal. Thus it represents an upper limit of real numbers, sensible for this simulation.
This creates a one dimensional optimization problem of F
−1(α)
X (p) to find the optimal
α-value for all assets. Given F
−1(α)
X (p) and α the relationship of F
−1(αg)
X (FX(g)) = g can
be optimized. The software makes use of a standardized solution for the one dimensional
optimization called the Brent-method. The parameters from every asset’s original pareto
distribution are saved and used to form individual probability distributions. By using a
moment matching estimation (MME), the losses of the top portfolio are fitted to a normal
distribution, resulting in FXc()˙. Given all the assets, with corresponding α-vector, the
optimal allocation is determined by the equation ci = F
−1(αi)
Xi
(FXc(CD)).
3.3 Performance measurement calculations
A general bank would determine their expected profit of a loan as a percentage return
on the invested loan. The estimated returns for the bank for portfolios A, B and C are
assumed to be 3%, 6% and 9%, thus assumed that the bank does not have any further
evaluation of return than on portfolio level. The RAROC is the ratio of estimated return
of the asset and economic capital allocated to that asset. This is the general conclusion,
here stated by Tasche.
Let ∅ 6= U ⊂ Rn be an open set and ρ : U → R be a function that is
partially differentiable in U with continuous derivatives. Let a = (a1,···,an) :
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U → Rn be a continuous vector field. Then a is suitable for performance
measurement with ρ if and only if
ai(X) =
∂ρ
∂Xi
(X), i = 1,···,n,X ∈ U
[Tasche 99, p.11 Theorem 4.4]
The vector, a, is exactly the vector used to determine economic capital and thus the
relation of estimated return and economic capital seems reasonable.
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Results
T
he following chapter summarize the results from the simulations in ’R’ [R Core Team 13].
The capital allocation methods use three different concepts to approach the cal-
culation of optimal allocation. Interestingly, the game theory and finance method
come to exactly the same conclusion, the best allocation is achieved by differentiation of
the risk measure. The optimization method does not take the risk measure in account
and instead develop an allocation that depend on the marginal distribution of the asset.
The results first present the Equal Bank scenario followed by the Unbalanced Bank sce-
nario. Results are displayed by bar-plotted graphs of the allocations on portfolio level
followed by diagrams over the allocation to each asset of the portfolios. The optimization
method allocates more capital to the low and medium risk portfolios compared to the
two other methods.
4.1 General results
The results from the two scenarios are displayed below
4.1.1 The Equal bank - Scenario 1
The Figure 4.1 show how the three capital allocation methods allocated economic cap-
ital, to portfolios A, B and C. Where economic capital is determined by ES0.95 and is
calculated on asset level, which means that the diversification effects between the assets
have been taken into account but not between the portfolios. By looking at Figure 4.1,
one quickly realize that the allocated capital from the game theory and finance method
allocate the same amount of capital to the three portfolios. This is no surprise since the
two methods use the same rule to allocate by. It is interesting that two such different
concepts manage to come to the same conclusion about optimal allocation. The opti-
mization method allocates capital more evenly distributed between the portfolios. The
optimization method has a higher allocation to portfolio A and B, which represents the
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low- and medium-risk portfolios. To the low-risk portfolio the method even allocates
more economic capital than the portfolio risk, determined by ES is. The next set of
figures show how the allocation methods allocate capital to the respective asset. Fig-
ure 4.2, show the allocation to Portfolio A, Figure 4.3, show the allocation to Portfolio
B and Figure 4.4, show the allocation to Portfolio C.
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Figure 4.1: The Equal Bank - Optimal capital allocation on portfolio level
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Figure 4.2: The Equal Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio A
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Figure 4.3: The Equal Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio B
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Figure 4.4: The Equal Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio C
It is again apparent that the game theory and finance method allocate economic
capital exactly the same, also on asset level. But generally, all three methods value the
risks of the assets in a similar pattern. When looking at the asset allocation curves the
methods roughly follow the same pattern for allocation. There are some great differences,
but some similarities too. Both the game theory and finance method allocate significantly
more capital to some assets, compared to the other assets. The optimization method
does not value these ’peak’ assets in the same way, instead it value all assets in a portfolio
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on a more even level. On the other hand the optimization method seems to allocate a
generally higher amount of capital to all assets compared to the game theory and finance
method. Because the game theory and finance method allocate much capital to the few
’peak’ assets, especially apparent for portfolio C, they have a higher level of allocated
capital to that portfolio, compared to the optimization method. These results will be
evaluated against the second simulation, the Unbalanced bank.
4.1.2 The Unbalanced bank - Scenario 2
This scenario have a similar approach to the simulation and Figure 4.5 begin by showing
how the three different capital allocation methods allocate economic capital, to the
portfolios A, B and C in a scenario prone to high risk. As for the previous scenario,
the economic capital is determined by ES0.95 and are calculated on asset level, which
means that the correlation between the assets have been taken into account but not on
the portfolio level.
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Figure 4.5: The Unbalanced Bank - Optimal capital allocation on portfolio level
Figure 4.5 show results that are consistent with the Equal Bank scenario; the opti-
mization method allocate more capital to the low- and medium-risk portfolios compared
to the other methods. The next set of figures show how the allocation methods allocate
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capital to the respective asset of the Unbalanced Bank scenario. Figure 4.6, show the
allocation to Portfolio A, Figure 4.7, show the allocation to Portfolio B and Figure 4.8,
show the allocation to Portfolio C.
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Figure 4.6: The Unbalanced Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio A
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Figure 4.7: The Unbalanced Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio B
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Figure 4.8: The Unbalanced Bank - Optimal allocation to portfolio C
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Figure 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show consistent results with the Equal Bank scenario; the
optimization method generally allocate more capital to the assets, but the game theory
and finance method allocate significantly more capital to certain ’peak’ assets.
4.2 Comments of results
There are a few important remarks to be done about the results.
First, all the data is fictional and simulated from an extreme value distribution. This
implicates that the asset distributions might not follow a realistic pattern that can be
found in empirical data. This is mostly because the simulation of assets vary signifi-
cantly from one run to the next e.g. the highest allocation to Portfolio C in the two
simulation are for the Equal bank around 3 and for the Unbalanced bank around 300.
This could be the explanation for the ’peak’ allocations found by the game theory and
finance methods in all simulations. In the low- and medium-risk portfolios these peak
assets could represent loans that have been wrongly estimated and would belong in the
high-risk portfolio. In the high-risk portfolio the peaks could represent loans to cus-
tomers with low credit rating or speculative loans with no security. This problem would
probably not be solved with an increased amount of simulations and thereby accuracy
of the ESα estimation. The solutions to receiving more consistent distributions lie in
the set up of the distribution parameters. For this simulation the varying values of the
distributions is of little significance, since the goal is to compare the characteristics of
the methods and not calculate values for allocations.
Secondly, the optimization method does not value these peak assets as risky. This
could be explained by the set up of the method, the optimization method is extremely
sensitive to the optimal α-vector; in equation ci = F
−1(αi)
Xi
(FXc(CD)). When the vector
have been determined, the rest of the allocation is a linear transformation with no
randomness. Because the software ’R’ only handle finite series of numbers, and not sup
and inf which are not finite, the space of real values need to be limited, which could be
a source of error in the method. The choice of accuracy depends on how the sup and
inf are limited, with a less restricted limitation than the one used the accuracy of the
α-vector would increase. With the implication that the accuracy of the model also would
increase. With this set up the optimization method is by far the slowest to compute,
and further accuracy of the α is a trade-off.
Thirdly, the allocation by the optimization method does not have an upper restriction
of possible amount of CE to allocate. Without scaling the results from the method with
CE the method would allocate more capital than the other methods.
In summary, the simulation provide relevant results for comparing differences and sim-
ilarities between the allocation methods since it builds on an equal setting for all three
methods. Because it is based on fictional data the actual values derived from the simu-
lation, should not be given much attention.
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4.3 Results from RAROC simulation
The simulation of the RAROC values have posed some difficulties. The set of data used
so far have only concerned losses and loss distributions, thus there is no information about
the sizes of the loans in the portfolios. The size of the loan would be a convenient input
parameter for determining the sizes of the returns of the loans and thereby the portfolios.
The expected % return for the portfolios have been estimated to 3%, 6% and 9% for the
portfolios A, B and C. In order to solve problem, the RAROC of the portfolios are
calculated as the ratio of estimated % return and the % of economic capital allocated
to each portfolio. Table 4.1 show the results from the RAROC calculations of the Equal
Bank scenario and Table 4.1 the same for the Unbalanced Bank scenario. As seen in
Game Theory Finance Optimization
Portfolio A (Low
Risk)
6.79% 6.74% 4.93%
Portfolio B
(Medium Risk)
4.13% 4.16% 3.28%
Portfolio C (High
Risk)
1.84% 1.84% 2.32%
Table 4.1: RAROC for the The Equal Bank Scenario
Game Theory Finance Optimization
Portfolio A (Low
Risk)
9.16% 9.16% 7.96%
Portfolio B
(Medium Risk)
5.27% 5.20% 4.32%
Portfolio C (High
Risk)
1.58% 1.58% 2.58%
Table 4.2: RAROC for the The Unbalanced Bank Scenario
the tables, all three methods work well for performance measures. Since the values are
fictional and the returns simple estimations, the numbers are not the important, but the
tables still can be used to distinguish characteristics of the methods. The methods show
quite similar results but there are some differences. Because the optimization method
allocates a larger % of economic capital to the low- and medium-risk portfolios, the
RAROC for these portfolios are lower than the corresponding portfolios for the other
methods. The RAROC of the riskier portfolio C is thus higher for the optimization
method, compared to the RAROC of the other methods for portfolio C. This implies
that the optimization method slightly favours risk taking to a greater extent than the
other methods; since it gives a higher RAROC to the risky portfolio compared to the
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other methods. The converse conclusion is that the other methods are slightly more risk
averse than the optimization method.
From a portfolio manager’s perspective, the result indicate that the more capital the
portfolio is allocated the higher return requirement is needed in order to get the same
RAROC. This means that the manager of portfolio C needs to take a higher interest on
the loans in order to get the same RAROC, and thus compensation, as the manager of
portfolio A. For the simulation the expected return are selected freely and thus might
not represent realistic values of a real retail bank, which could explain the variations of
the RAROC values of portfolios A, B and C.
The RAROC calculation takes the risk of the loans into account, which gives a fair
comparison of the three portfolios. Each portfolio is evaluated after the portfolios ability
to gain a return. If a ROC calculation would be performed, no account to the risk of
the portfolios would be taken into account. Each portfolio would then receive a return
requirement based on the capital held by the portfolio, and not the economic capital
allocated to the portfolio. A ROC measure would give an unfair requirement to the
portfolios with lower risk exposure, if compared to each other. Instead of comparing
the portfolios against each other the portfolios would have to be evaluated against some
exogenously determined hurdle values. By reaching the hurdle value, or above, the
performance of the portfolios would be determined.
With the RAROC measure the hurdle value is not needed, all portfolios can be com-
pared equally against each other. The RAROC is thus more competitive and pose as a
simpler to way to determine the performance of the portfolios.
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Conclusion
T
his section summarize the results and conclusions made from the thesis into
Table 5.1 on page 53. The problem questions are answered through a discussion
and the chapter concludes with suggestions for future investigation.
The finance method is considered to be the most intuitive of the proposed capital
allocation methods. It is simple and quick to compute and the concept of the model can
be easily understood. The method is based on intuitive and accepted financial concepts
such as expected value and standard deviation. The game theory approach also introduce
an easy concept for allocation of capital. The analogy to a game of players and costs for
participation is intuitive and easily translated to a bank with portfolios and an allocation
problem. When looking closer at the theory applying the game situation on an allocation
problem, the method is less intuitive and propose some complex concepts in order to
reach the final computation. The optimization approach is the least intuitive method,
the concept of minimizing the risk residual is quite easy to understand but when the
computation starts, the method quickly looses simplicity and is demanding to follow.
In order to fulfil the stability condition, the method needs to be insensitive to an extra
simulation and not too restrictive on the underlying assumptions. The game theory and
finance methods depend on the differentiation of a coherent risk measure. Such method
have been presented, ES, and therefore cannot be considered as an overly restrictive un-
derlying condition. Because the allocation depends on the gradient of the risk measure
and the exposure by the individual asset, the allocation does not change dramatically by
more assets introduced into one or more portfolio of the bank. The optimization method
reach a unique solution when F
−1(α)
X (p) = F
−1
X (p) otherwise the method might reach a
local optimal allocation and not the global. The method also depends on where in the
corporate tree the allocation is performed, a new α-vector needs to be calculated if e.g.
the allocation level changes from portfolio to, for example, business unit level. When
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these conditions are fulfilled the method does not change much for an introduction of a
new asset and could thus be considered stable.
The finance approach is regarded as the most straight-forward and transparent ap-
proach. The concept of calculating the marginal risk contribution of assets and portfolios
are considered logical. The notion of determining the contributions from the differenti-
ation of the same risk measure that determined the risk of the portfolio, is transparent.
The game theory method can be ranked as second among the suggested methods, the
analogy to a game makes the method transparent but assumptions following the theory
is less revise. The theory leads to a simple transparent calculation, which is the same as
the one for the finance approach. The optimization approach is the least transparent,
the allocation method can easily be thought of as a black box method, which is hard to
follow for anyone that is not part of building the model. Assumptions about the method
are complex and not always easy to follow.
As shown by the simulations all of the proposed capital allocation methods are able to
allocate capital on a more granular level than portfolio level. In the simulation the most
granular level is a model point, which represents a group of customers with similar risk
profile to their loan. Both the game theory and finance method can allocate to a single
loss, since the two methods depend on the relative size of the risk exposures from the
customers. The optimization method is limited by the marginal distribution function of
a customer, if that function can be determined for a single customer then optimization
is as granular as the two other methods. The granularity increase the accuracy of the
method but with increased granularity the amount of calculations is increased. When
it comes to the speed of the allocation methods the optimization method is the slowest
to compute and the accuracy can be increased by a more accurate calculation of the
α-vector. The accuracy of the other two methods is less obvious, it is determined by the
accuracy of the CE calculation. For these simulations the CE calculation is limited by
the number of simulations of each asset, a higher number of simulations increases the
accuracy of the calculation. The trade-off between accuracy and speed of the allocation
is determined by the application and the computational capacity.
All three methods are good as performance metrics and can be used to determine the
RAROC of a portfolio. When comparing the results of the methods, the game theory
and finance method give a higher RAROC to the low- and medium-risk portfolios com-
pared to the optimization method, which gives the high-risk portfolios a higher RAROC.
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Stable Intuitive Transparent
Allocation
below
portfolio
level
Suitability
as Perfor-
mance
Measure-
ment
Game
Theory
Yes
Simple
concept
The final
computa-
tion is as
transparent
as the
financial
approach
but the as-
sumptions
leading
there are
sometimes
unclear
Yes, to loss
level
Suitable
Finance Yes
Most
intuitive
Most
transparent
Yes, to loss
level
Suitable
Optimization Yes
Simple
concept but
calculations
quickly get
difficult to
understand
Black-box
method
Yes, needs
marginal
distribution
of loss
thereby
most
granular
allocation
is to a
model point
Suitable
Table 5.1: Results for the three allocation methods
5.1 Suggestions for future investigations
It would be interesting to test the allocation methods on real data instead of the
fictional, in order to be able to compare the specific amount of capital allocated to the
portfolios and not only their conceptual differences.
One could also determine the value of the α-vector with higher accuracy and test if the
optimization method also finds the ’peak’ assets in the simulations.
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